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REDEMPTION AND REINSTATEMENT 
IN CHAPTER 7 CASES 
DA YID GRAY CARLSON' 
The Bankruptcy Code gives debtors a chance to redeem certain personal 
property from their secured creditors for the appraised value of the collateral, even 
though the unsecured deficit claim of the secured creditors remains unpaid. Insofar 
as debtors are concerned, this right is a considerable improvement from state law 
which requires the secured party's entire debt to be paid. 1 The redemption right in 
bankruptcy, however, is surprisingly complex when considered in conjunction with 
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Jhis Article attempts to put in context all issues related to the redemption right 
in Bankruptcy Code section 722.2 In pursuit of this goal, Part I of this Article 
describes the various elements of the redemption right and how they have been 
interpreted. Among other things, it will relate redemption to the controversial topic 
of bifurcation-the ability or inability of debtors in bankruptcy to split an 
undersecured claim into two diverse, unrelated claims-one perfectly secured and one 
perfectly unsecured. Redemption will be shown to rely heavily on a theory of 
bifurcation even as the United States Supreme Court has disapproved of bifurcations 
in other contexts.3 
Part II considers the injunctive theory which, quite apart from section 722, 
permits a debtor to retain collateral over the opposition of secured parties on 
condition that the debtor stays current on the payments due under a prepetition 
agreement. Part III tries to calculate the effect that the mysterious and ineffectual 
section 521(2) has on redemption and related pro-debtor theories for bailing out 
collateral from the clutches of undersecured creditors. The Article concludes with 
a discussion of reaffirmation of security agreements and its interaction with the 
redemption right. 
I. REDEMPTION IN GENERAL 
In 1979, the Bankruptcy Code introduced individual debtors to a new 
redemption right in chapter 7.4 According to section 722: 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. Of Counsel, Squadron, 
Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, New York City. 
1 See U.C.C. § 9-506 (1990) (requiring that individual in order to redeem must fulfill all obligations secured 
by collateral as well as secured party's reasonably incurred expenses). 
2 See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1994) (authorizing individual debtor to redeem tangible property intended for 
personal, family, or household use). 
3 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,416 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) (finding that§ 506(d) would not allow 
debtor lo "strip down" lien on real property). 
4 See generally ROBERT A. HESSLING, REAFFIRMATION AND.REDEMPTION 299-305 (1994) (discussing new 
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An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right 
to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended 
primarily for personal, family, or household use from a lien securing a 
dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under section 
522 of this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by 
paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of 
such holder that is secured by such lien. 5 
The debtor's unilateral power to retrieve collateral for its appraised value must 
be compared to the less generous redemption right under Uniform Commercial Code 
("UCC") section 9-506.6 The principal difference is that, under the Bankruptcy 
Code, the total claim of the secured party can remain largely unpaid, and yet the 
debtor may still bail out individual items of collateral by paying the appraised value 
of the item in question. 7 Under the- UCC, however, not the tiniest shard of collateral 
can be saved unless. the entire claim of the secured party is paid in full. 8 
The elements of redemption under the Bankruptcy Code are as follows. First, 
the collateral must be tangible.9 Unlike Lady Macbeth's dagger, it must be as 
sensible to feeling as it is to sight. Second, the property must be personal, not real, 
property-though a few courts have stretched personal property to- include 
fixtures. 10 Third, the collateral must be intended primarily for personal, family, or 
redemption right based upon recommendations of Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of United States and 
ucc § 9-506). 
5 11 U.S-.C. § 722. 
6 UCC § 9-506 provides: 
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its 
disposition under Section 9-504 or before the obligation has been discharged under Section 9-
505(2) the debtor or any other secured party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default 
redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well 
as the expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing the 
collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the extent provided in the agreement and 
not prohibited by law, his reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses. 
u.c.c. § 9-506. 
1 See generally In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 186-88 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (Spector, J.) (discussing how 
debtor reacquires items of collateral.for its fair market value). 
8 See In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 588 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey, J.) ("UCC 9-506 requires that all 
obligations secured by collateral ... must be paid to redeem while Section 722 gives the debtor the right to 
redeem by payment of the amount of the allowed secured claim, or the market value of the property ... "). 
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (allowing for redemption of "tangible personal property"); Redding v. Signal 
Consumer Discount Co. (In re Redding), 34 B.R. 971, 972 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (Woodside, J.) (finding 
automobile to be tangible property but not "household goods"). 
111 See, e.g., In re Walker, 173 B.R. 512, 516 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994). In Walker, Judge William Stocks 
found that aluminum siding to a house was personal property because the parties so intended. See id. This 
agreement was evidenced from the sales contract's reference to the siding as sale of "goods." See id. Next 
time, however, a secured party may be able to evade § 722 by declaring in the agreement that the fixture is 
to be considered real property. Meanwhile, in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hall (In re Hall), 11 B.R. 3 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980), the parties did intend for a fence to become a fixture. See id. Nevertheless, the 
· courts permitted redemption because the parties contemplated that, in case of default, the fence could be 
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household use. 11 Even a mobile home is eligible for redemption, 12 though, of 
course, real estate is expressly eliminated in section 722. Apparently, the collateral 
need not have been used by the debtor for these purposes prior to bankruptcy, but, 
rather, must be intended for such use after redemption. 13 
Fourth, the debt secured by the collateral to be redeemed must be a consumer 
debt. This is defined as a "debt incurred by an individual prilTlarily for a personal, 
family, or household purpose. "14 Fifth, the debtor must be entitled to a discharge 
from any unsecured deficit claim the secured party might have against the debtor. 15 
As applied to security interests under Article 9, the redemption right might be 
destroyed if the debtor made false representations in order to obtain credit16 or 
forgot to schedule the secured claim as required by section 521(1). 17 In addition, 
various acts unrelated to the secured party's claim may have been committed which 
would result in the loss of a discharge against any claim. In such a case, the debtor 
would also lose the right to redeem. For example, if the debtor made a fraudulent 
conveyance, hid or destroyed property within a year of bankruptcy, 18 has hidden, 
falsified, or failed to keep records, 19 has committed bankruptcy crimes,20 has 
refused to explain how property disappeared,21 or has received a general discharge 
severed from the real property and become personal property once again. See id. at 4. 
11 Some older cases have held that business items, like farm eq~ipment and livestock, might be redeemed. 
See Sprecher v. Bank of Yates City (In re Sprecher), 65 B.R. 598 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Altenberger, J.). 
Such cases were not founded on § 722, however. See id. at 601 n.1. Rather, such cases were based on the 
theory that, under§ 506(d), a debtor could avoid an undersecured party's lien for the unsecured deficit. See 
id. For example, if collateral is worth $80 and the secured party claims $100, a debtor could bifurcate the. 
claim into an $80 secured claim and a $20 unsecured claim and, under§ 506(d), could avoid the lien for any 
part of the $20 unsecured claim. Sprecher went further by allowing the debtor to redeem the collateral by 
a cash payment to the secured party. See id. at 601-02. A redemption right of this sort was specifically 
negated in Lindsey v. Federal Land Bank (In re Lindsey), 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.), and 
ev~ally, the Supreme Court ruled that § 506(d) could not be used to bifurcate undersecured claims at 
all-at least by debtors in chapter 11. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416 (1992) (Blackmun, J.). 
Hence, the theories upon which Sprecher were based are now completely foreclosed. On the meaning of 
Dewsnup v. Timm, see David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 10 AM.· 
BANKR. L.J. 1 (1996). 
12 See Terre Haute First Nat'I Bank v. Davis (In re Davis), 20 B.R. 212, 212-13 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (Baker, 
J.) (treating mobile home as eligible for redemption but denying debtor opportunity to redeem mobile home 
by installment payments). 
13 See In re Pipes, 78 B.R. 981, 983-84 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (Koger, J.) (finding debtor could not 
redeem auto not intended for own personal use). 
14 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (1994); see HESSLING, supra note 4, at 307-10 (discussing definition of consumer 
debt); see also Boitnott v. United Va. Bank (In re Boitnott), 4 B.R. 122, 124 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) 
(Pearson, J.) (consumer status survived consolidation of two debts). 
15 See In re Blount, 4 B.R. 92, 97 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (discussing elements of redemption). 
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). 
17 See id. § 523(a)(3). 
18 See id. § 727(a)(2). 
19 See id. § 727(a)(3). 
20 See id. § 727(a)(4). 
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5), (6). 
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in any bankruptcy case within the previous six years,22 then the redemption right 
disappears. 
The rule of dischargeability creates an inherent conflict in the Bankruptcy 
Code's timing rules. According to section 521(2), added in the 1984 amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must file a statement of an intent to redeem or 
surrender collateral within thirty days of a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition ( or before 
a creditors' meeting, if earlier).23 The debtor must execute that intent forty-five 
days thereafter. 24 Meanwhile, a creditor has sixty days after a creditors' meeting 
to file an objection to discharge.25 If no objection is filed, all debts are 
discharged.26 Hence, a debtor must redeem before it is known whether the 
underlying debt is dischargeable. To solve this contradiction, one judge has 
recommended that debtors ignore the time limits under section 521(2).27 Another 
judge has ruled that redemption can occur provisionally even though discharge might 
be denied at a later time.28 · 
The sixth and final element of redemption is that the property to be redeemed 
must be exempt or abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee.29 These types of property 
are discussed in the following two sections. 
As a final matter, section 722 implies a deadline by which a bankruptcy petition 
must be filed in order to preserve the right to redeem. Sin.ce section 722 refers to 
redeeming personal property "from a lien," the lien must still exist. Thus, a 
prepetition foreclosure sale would terminate the lien and hence the right of the 
debtor to redeem. Mere repossession of the personal property, however, would have 
no such effect; repossessed collateral may still be redeemed.30 
A. Exempt Property 
If property is exempt, certain security interests can be avoided altogether under 
section 522(f)(l)(B).31 If a security interest is partly avoided, and if the debtor 
22 See id. § 727(a)(9) (unless creditors received 100 cents on-the-dollar, or, under reorganization plan 
presented and executed in good faith, 70 cents on-the-dollar). 
23 See id. § 521 (2)(A). 
24 See id. § 521(2)(B); In re Logan, 124 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991). 
25 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(a). 
26 See id. 4004(c); see also id. 4005 (placing burden of proving objection to discharge on plaintiff). 
27 See In re Cassar, 139 B.R. 253, 254 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (Brumbaugh, J.) (stating that debtor's motion 
to redeem is premature until "the time limit has expired for the filing of§ 523 complaints and/or the time 
limit has expired for the filing of objections to the debtor's claimed exemptions (or the property has been 
abandoned.") 
28 See In re Pipes, 78 B.R. 981,983 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (Koger, J.) (allowing redemption even though 
debt might not be dischargeable ). This aspect of Pipes is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 66-
69. 
29 See 11 U.S.C. § 722. 
30 See Karr v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Karr), 129 B.R. 498, 501-02 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1991) (Sellers, J.) ( finding that secured party had "repossession" certificate of title issued as to motor vehicle, 
but debtor could still redeem). 
31 See generally David Gray Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments 
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wishes to redeem the exempt property, only the valid part of the security interest 
need be paid. 
This follows from section 722's requirement that the debtor may redeem 
property "from a lien:" If a secured creditor has lost part of her lien to an avoidance 
theory, then the debtor need only pay off the lien that the creditor still owns. On 
the other hand, if the trustee avoids a security interest (because it is, for example, 
a voidable preference),32 the lien belongs to the trustee.33 The debtor must still 
pay this lien, even though the secured party has been deprived of it by avoidance 
and preservation. 34 
Many exemptions are limited in dollar amount. Nevertheless, all security 
interests on such an item may be discharged through redemption. For example, 
under section 522(d)(2), the debtor may exempt "[t]he debtor's interest, not to 
exceed $2,400 in value, in one motor vehicle. "35 If the debtor owns a Rolls Royce 
worth $80,000, the whole amount may be redeemed because it is "exempt 
property, "36 even though only a fender and perhaps the hood ornament would have 
exhausted the monetary· limit of the exemption. 
When exempt property is described by a quantitative dollar amount, as well as 
by a qualitative aspect (as the car is under section 522(d)(2)), the general creditors 
may have an interest in !he exempt property once the valid senior security interest 
and the exemption amount are subtracted. Returning to the Rolls Royce example, 
suppose it is encumbered by a $70,000 purchase money security interest, as well as 
a $2,400 exemption. The general creditors would then enjoy an interest of $7,600. 
In such a circumstance, it should be understood that the trustee as a hypothetical 
judicial lien creditor under section 544(a)(l) has a lien on the car just as the secured 
creditor does. Thus, to redeem the car, the debtor must pay $70,000 to the secured 
party and $7,600 to the chapter 7 trustee. 
Similarly, if the trustee incurs "the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving, or disposing of, such property," the trustee can recover those 'expenses 
to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 57 (1996) [hereinafter Carlson, After the 1994 
Amendments]; David Gray Carlson, Security Interests on Exempt Personal Property: Their Fate in 
Bankruptcy; 3 J. BANKR. LAW & PRAC. 247 (1993} [hereinafter Carlson, Their Fate in Bankruptcy}. A debtor 
can avoid non purchase money and nonpossessory security interests in designated property. A pledge therefore 
survives avoidance under§ 522(f)(l)(B) but it is subject to redemption under§ 722 provided all the elements 
of§ 722 are met. See In re Ridner, 102 B.R. 247, 248-50 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (allowing redemption 
of jewelry from creditor with possessory security interest). 
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
33 See id. § 551. : 
3~ If a debtor voluntarily conveys a voidable security interest on exempt property, and if that security 
interest survives debtor avoidance under § 522(f)(l)(B), the debtor forfeits the exemption, and the trustee 
succeeds to the avoided security interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(l)(A); Carlson, Their Fate in Bankruptcy, 
supra note 31, at 255-59. 
35 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2). 
36 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 381 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6337. 
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"from property" under section 506(c).37 As this constitutes a trustee's superpriority 
lien on the collateral, the debtor will have to pay the section 506( c) expenses to 
redeem the property as well. 38 
One problem the debtor faces is that the unilateral right to redeem over the 
opposition of the creditor requires that the lien the debtor pays off must secure a 
"dischargeable consumer debt.'139 Yet the trustee's hypothetical judicial lien may 
not, and the trustee's section 506(c) definitely will not, involve "debt incurred by 
an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose. 1140 Therefore, 
the debtor must obtain the trustee's consent before successfully redeeming property 
in which the bankruptcy estate has an interest. Only creditors whose claims are 
consumer loans are forced to take redemption payments against their will. 
B. Abandoned Property 
A debtor may redeem nonexempt property if the trustee has abandoned it.41 In 
a chapter 7 case, this implies the collateral is overencumbered and the debtor's 
equity in it is valueless. 
After collateral is abandoned,42 the secured party, is still barred from taking 
action because the automatic stay continues to apply until such time as the debtor's 
discharge is granted or denied.43 Of course, before that time, the stay could be 
lifted by motion of the secured party if there is no adequate protection.44 
Abandonment requires that the trustee or some other party in interest move the 
court for an abandonment order and the court grant such motion.45 The requirement 
of an accomplished abandonment solves a conceptual problem with redemption. 
Ordinarily, when a debtor pays down a secured claim on property, the event tends 
to enrich the unsecured creditors, who now may look to the disencumbered part of 
the collateral for their recovery.46 Of course, if the debtor's payment of a secured 
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
38 See In re EES Lambert Assocs., 62 B.R. 328, 338 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (providing that superpriority 
creditor claim is paid before attorney's fees incident to bankruptcy proceeding). 
39 See 11 U.S.C. § 722. 
40 See id. § 101(8). 
41 See id. § 722 (allowing for redemptions if such property "has been abandoned under section 554"). 
42 See id. § 554. 
43 See id. § 362(c)(2); see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1057 (6th 
Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J.); In re Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581, 592 (Banlcr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey, J.). 
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(l). But see Riggs Nat'! Bank v. Perry (In re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir. 
1984). Riggs is discussed infra notes 117-137 and accompanying text. Professor Joann Henderson notes that, 
based on the language of§ 362(d)(2), a secured party is entitled to have a stay lifted after abandonment, even 
though the debtor may wish to redeem property or negotiate a reaffirmation. She argues that these legitimate 
debtor purposes ought to be further reason, not mentioned in§ 362(d), to prevent lifting the automatic stay. 
See Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief A Quantum Leap from Strip Down _to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 
8 BANKR. DEV. J. 131, 146-47, 163-65 (1991). 
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 554; FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007. 
46 See In re Union Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757, 769 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (Scholl, J.). 
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creditor only serves to enrich the unsecured creditors, the debtor will never redeem. 
Section 722 does not expressly preclude a bankruptcy trustee from laying claim to 
the new debtor equity created by the debtor's payment of the secured claim. Once 
the property has been abandoned, however, the estate's interest in the property no 
longer exists.47 Therefore, any disencumbrance through payment adheres solely to 
the debtor personally. Under these conditions, redemption becomes economically 
rational for debtors. 
Suppose, however, that some payments by the debtor occurred before 
abandonment. As the estate will still have an interest in the property, do these pre-
abandonment payments adhere to the benefit of unsecured creditors? The answer 
should be no, on the following basis: we should riot conceive of the debtor as 
paying the secured claim, but rather, buying it. Standing in the shoes of the senior 
secured party, the unsecured creditors could not then claim any debtor equity. 
Rather, the property is still overencumbered, in part by a security interest retained 
by the secured party (for the unpaid amount) and in part by a security interest that 
the debtor has bought. The overencumbrance will lead to the property's 
abandonment, at which point the debtor can complete the redemption process.48 
One difficult redemption puzzle involves converting a chapter 13 case to chapter 
7, where the debtor will have paid some dollars to an undersecured creditor.49 
Recent legislation indicates clearly enough that the disencumbered collateral cannot 
be viewed as security for the unsecured deficit claim of the secured party.so Dollars 
paid to reduce the secured claim thus create an equity that belongs to the debtor, not 
to the secured party. The amendment, however, does not eliminate the possibility 
that payments under the chapter 13 plan disencumber the property for the benefit of 
the undersecured creditors. One court,of appeals opinion has suggested as much.s 1 
If, however, the chapter 13 payments are viewed as not paying, the secured claim, 
but rather buying it, the debtor will then be the beneficiary of the payments-not the 
chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. 
-, Another puzzle arises from the terminology of section 722, which does not quite 
work with regard to abandoned property. Section 722 requires a debtor to pay a 
47 See In re J.A.V. AG., Inc., 154 B.R. 923, 926 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (Clark, J.) (noting that 
effective abandonment removes property from bankruptcy estate); see also In re Argiannis, 156 B.R. 683, 
688. (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (Proctor, J.) (stating that abandonment divests bankruptcy estate of control over 
"abandoned property and revests title in debtor). 
48 I have suggested this same concept solves the contradiction between the fact that a secured creditor's right 
to postpetition interest under § 506(b) is limited to the amount of the equity cushion and the fact that a 
secured creditor might receive cash payments on interest or principal, thereby expanding the cushion. See 
David Gray Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b): The Limits of 
Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 387-94 (1990). 
49 See, e.g., Liberty Nat'! Bank and Trust v. Burba (In re Burba), No. 93-6479, 1994 WL 709314, at *l 
(6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1994) (discussing whether debtor may redeem property from lien by paying remaining 
balance on chapter 13 and converting to chapter 7). 
511 See 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2). This legislation is discussed in Carlson, supra n()te 11, at 35. 
51 See Burba, 1994 WL 709314, at *17. 
296 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:289 
secured creditor "the amount of the allowed secured claim." An "allowed secured 
claim" presupposes that the secured creditor (or someone on her behalf)52 has filed 
a proof of claim.53 If no proof of claim has been filed, then no "allowed secured 
claim" exists, and redemption would seem to be impossible. Furthermore, section 
506(a) implies that an "allowed secured claim ... is a secured claim to the extent 
of such creditor's interest in the estate 's interest in such property . . . "54 If 
property has been abandoned, the property is no longer "of the estate." It has 
occasionally been held that, after abandonment, the bankruptcy court has no 
jurisdiction to value non-estate assets.55 Such a position, if asserted in the context 
of redemption, would make impossible the redemption of abandoned property, 
unless the debtor presciently obtained a valuation prior to abandonment.56 In any 
case, the debtor faces the further problem that redemption implies that the secured 
creditor has an "allowed secured claim." Hence, if these definitions are to be taken 
seriously, it may also be necessary that the secured creditor (or some other party 
authorized to file for the secured creditor) have filed a timely proof of claim in 
conjunction with the valuation. Yet, oddly, if the property is non-exempt, the debtor 
is not even entitled to redeem it until the property "has been abandoned." If the 
exact words of the Bankruptcy Code are to be honored, a court must be willing to 
value collateral in anticipation of an abandonment. As a debtor is entitled to notice 
of a trustee's motion to abandon, it should be valid grounds to deny abandonment 
until such time as the collateral is properly valued, so that the debtor's redemption 
right might be vindicated. 
C. Bifurcation 
Under state law, a partial payment of an unsecured claim has the ordinary effect 
of improving the security of the creditor, as payment increasingly shrink the 
unsecured deficit and leaves the collateral intact.57 Redemption under section 722 
could not have such an effect because, otherwise, the debtor would have to pay the 
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (granting such power to trustees, debtors and subrogees). 
53 See id. §§ 502(a), 506(d)(2). 
54 See id. § 506 (emphasis added). 
55 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1045-47 (5th Cir. 1996) (King, 
J.) (en bane) (finding§ 506(a) does not apply to exempt property because it is not "of the estate"); Dewsnup 
v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 590-92 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), aff'd, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); 
contra Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (Hutchinson, J.). 
56 See Henderson, supra note 44, at 147 (arguing that these procedural niceties be ignored in order to 
effectuate post-abandonment redemption). 
57 This assumption has been used to rule that, as a matter of law, payment of unencumbered dollars to an 
undersecured creditor are always preferential, when the debtor is insolvent at the time. See Barash v. Public 
Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir. 1981); see generally David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the 
Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 269-79. 
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entire secured claim before the collateral were truly redeemed from the lien.58 
Section 722 would then be identical to the mediocre rule of UCC section 9-506. 
Yet section 722, by its terms, defines redemption as "paying the holder ... the 
amount of the allowed secured claim . . . "59 Thus, if a secured creditor claims 
$100 and the collateral is worth a mere $80, the redemption is accomplished by 
paying the secured creditor $80, "the amount of the allowed secured claim." In 
effect, redemption presupposes that the $100 claim is bifurcated into two parts, with 
the lien on the collateral entirely null and void for the $20 deficit. The payment 
therefore extinguishes (or perhaps buys) the secured portion, and the collateral never 
again becomes collateral for the unsecured deficit. 
In Dewsnup v. Timm, 60 the Supreme Court ruled that, for the purposes of 
section 506(d), "allowed secured claim" means $100.61 If this definition were to 
export itself into section 722, then the Bankruptcy Code's liberal redemption 
provision would revert back to the harsher UCC provision. The Dewsnup opinion, 
however, also made clear that, under section 506(a), the phrase "allowed secured 
claim" refers only to $80. Which of these two definitions applies to ·section 722?62 
There seems to be an unstated but universal agreement that, insofar as section 
722 is concerned, "allowed secured claim" takes the meaning of section 506(a). In 
the above example, the debtor could redeem the collateral for $80. This in turn 
implies that the redemption rests upon a foundation of final bifurcation. 
For this reason, Judge John Ninfo, in In re Lombardi,63 could rule that a junior 
secured claim might be valued at zero, for redemption purposes, where the senior 
secured party W(ls under water. This opinion accords with the notion that the 
"allowed secured claim" truces on the meaning of section 506(a). Indeed, Judge 
Ninfo went too far in insisting that the redemption price was $10, to cover the 
secured party's cost of releasing the lien. The price of redemption should be the 
amount of the allowed secured claim. The $10 cost is no part of the allowed 
secured claiin, when the secured party enjoys no equity cushion in the collateral.64 
Indeed, it is the secured party's affirmative duty to execute the proper release of the 
58 See Terre Haute First Nat'! Bank v. Davis (In re Davis), 20 B.R. 212, 214 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (Baker, J.) 
(contrasting § 722 and UCC § 9-506). 
59 See II U.S.C. § 722 (emphasis added). 
60 502 U.S. 410 (1992). 
61 See id. at 417. 
62 Justice Blackmun does not refer to § 722 in his opinion, except to say that the lower court had ruled that 
a debtor's use of § 506(d) to bifurcate an undersecured claim would turn § 506(d) into a redemption 
provision, thereby rendering§ 722 useless. See id. at 414. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, spends some effort 
to show that permanent bifurcation by use of§ 506(d) would not deprive § 722 of all turf. See id. at 428. 
· 63 195 B.R. 585 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
64 If an equity cushion existed, the secured party might claim the $ I 0, if the contract commits the debtor 
to pay it. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). Absent the equity cushion, the $10 cost is not part of the secured party's 
allowed claim-secured or unsecured. 
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security interest.65 Therefore, Judge Ninfo set the price-which should have been 
zero-at too high a level. 
One case suggests that redemption does not imply a final bifurcation. In In re 
Pipes,66 Judge Frank Koger ruled that redemption could occur even if a debt turned 
out later to be nondischargeable.67 This alone seems questionable because section 
722 makes dischargeability of debt a precondition to section 722 redemption.68 It, 
then, appears that a court must find a debt dischargeable before redemption can 
proceed; redemption then should serve as res judicata as to the question of 
dischargeability, at least as far as the secured party is concerned. But, in discussing 
the effect of a later ruling that the secured claim is not dischargeable, Judge Koger 
wrote: 
Obviously, if discharge is eventually denied to the debtor under Section 727; 
or if a debt secured by a non-purchase money, non-possessory security 
interest in household goods is held non-dischargeable, the rights of the 
creditor remain intact as to enforcement of the payment of the money due, 
and in the case of Section 727, .remain intact in all aspects.69 
This dictum could be interpreted to mean that a later denial of discharge repeals the 
bifurcation implicit in section 722. Such an implication should be rejected. 
Discharge has nothing to do with bifurcation. The former refers to the existence of 
unsecured debt. The latter identifies which claims encumber property. Discharge 
is an in personam consideratio~, while the finality of bifurcation is strictly in rem. 70 
Therefore, prior to authorizing a redemption, a court should find that the debt 
secured by colla1eral is dischargeable. Such a ruling should be res judicata as to the 
secured creditor and should not later be revoked. Even if it could be revoked, 
bifurcation under section 722 is final. The failure _of discharge would make the 
former secured party an unsecured creditor for the unpaid deficit, but this same 
creditor would have no security interest on the collateral that the debtor has 
redeemed. At best, the creditor could obtain a judicial lien through the ordinary 
judicial process against the redeemed property.71 
65 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2121 (McKinney 1996). 
66 78 B.R. 981 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). 
61 See id. at 983. 
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (stating that individual debtor may redeem tangible personal property intended to 
be utilized mainly for "personal, family or household use" from lien securing dischargeable consumer debt). 
69 Pipes, 78 B.R. at 983. 
70 See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991) (Marshall, J.) (noting that bankruptcy discharge 
"extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim-an in personam action"); In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 177 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) allows debtor to discharge in personam liability 
of post-bifurcation unsecured claim). 
71 One bifurcation issue could prove troublesome to a secured creditor. If two debtors jointly sign a security 
agreement and jointly own collateral, but only one debtor is bankrupt, the bankrupt debtor may redeem the 
collateral up to her joint interest in the collateral. See, e.g., Sprecher v. Bank of Yates City (In re Sprecher), 
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D. Valuations 
Redemption ultimately requires a judicial valuation of collateral. Valuation in 
tum requires standards.72 Two different Bankruptcy Code provisions arguably apply 
to guide valuations in the context of redemption. First, since allowed secured claims 
are at stake, section 506(a) might apply. That section states: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which 
the estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value 
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property ... Such 
. value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the 
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any 
hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's 
interest.73 
As we have seen, however, some have suggested that this provision can only govern 
property "of the estate." Property that the trustee has abandoned or that the debtor 
has exempted is not "of the estate. "74 
Another possible standard is·· section 522(a)(2), which applies to exempt 
property. According to this section: 
"value" means far market value as of the date of the filing of the petition or, 
with respect to property that becomes property of the estate after such date, 
as of the date such property becomes property of the estate. 75 
This definition, however, is only valid "[i]n this section"-meaning section 522. The 
definition might not be exportable to section 722 redemption. In any case, 
redemption applies to nonexempt property that the trustee has abandoned. There is 
no good reason to use section 522(a)(2)'s definition for nonexempt property. 
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bel/),76 Judge Robert 
Krupansky, in dictum, suggested that section 506(a) should be the guiding beacon 
65 B.R. 598 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Altenberger, J.). The secured party is then left only with a security 
interest on the nonbankrupt debtor's half. Obviously, this development decreases the value of the collateral 
to the secured party and incidentally lowers the redemption price the bankrupt debtor has to pay-on the 
assumption that a buyer at a foreclosure sale would pay less than 50% of a thing's worth if the buyer remains 
a cotenant of the thing with some stranger. See id. at 601. Because of bifurcation, the secured party cannot 
claim to reach the whole of the collateral through the part ownership of the nonbankrupt debtor. See id. 
72 See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Valuations in Bankruptcy, 41 AM. 
U. L. REV. 63 (1991); see also Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Economics and the Rhetoric of 
Valuation, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. l (1995). 
73 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
74 See supra notes 54.-55 and accompanying text. 
75 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2). 
76 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983). 
300 ABI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:289 
of valuation, in spite of the above problems.77 This implicates redemption in a 
debate currently raging amongst the courts: should the market value represent what 
the secured party would have realized in a foreclosure sale under state law, or ·· 
should the debtor's actual use of the collateral be taken into account. Some courts 
think that the first sentence of section 506(a) limits the secured party to the 
liquidation (or wholesale) value of the collateral. Others think that the second 
sentence requires a higher replacement value, because the debtor, intending to use 
the collateral, would otherwise have to replace it.78 
In the context of redemption, some courts have set the redemption at wholesale 
value.79 Other courts have set the redemption price at an even lower amount-the 
amount a secured party would take away from a foreclosure sale after sales expenses 
are covered.80 Such a standard need not imply a distress auction;81 rather, it might 
imply what the UCC refers to as a "commercially reasonable sale. "82 This succeeds 
in putting the creditor in the same position as she would have been if the foreclosure 
sale went forward, a criterion strongly supported by the legislative history of the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code. According to the legislative history: 
Under [section 722], the debtor may redeem from a secured creditor 
property that would be exempt in the absence of the security interest, or 
property that the trustee abandons, if the debtor pays the secured creditor the 
allowed amount of the creditor's secured claim. This right amounts to a 
right of first refusal on a foreclosure sale of the property involved. It allows 
the debtor to retain his necessary property and avoid high replacement 
costs, and does not prevent the creditor from obtaining what he is entitled 
to under the_ terms of his contract.83 
77 See id. at 1055 n.3 (citing First Bank & Trust Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 8 B.R.1020, 1022 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 
1981) (MacMahon, J.)); see also In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155, 186 n.40 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (Spector, 
J.). 
78 The Fifth Circuit recently debated this question with nine judges favori~g the privilege of§ 506(a)'s first 
sentence-lading to wholesale value. See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036 
(5th Cir. 1996) (King, J.) (en bane). Six judges favored replacement value on the strength of§ 506(a)'s 
second sentence. See id. at 1061. • 
79 See In re Penick, 170 B.R. 914, 917 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (Stevenson, J.); Redding v. Signal 
Consumer Discount Co. (In re Redding), 34 B.R. 971, 973 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (Woodside, J). 
80 See In re Walker, 173 B.R. 512,516 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994) (Stocks, J.) (deducting cost ofremoving 
fixtures from secured claim); see also Pierce v. Industrial Savs. Co. (In re Pierce), 5 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1980) (Crawford, J.) (declaring intent of§ 722 is to put creditor in same position it would have been 
in if allowed to repo_ssess). 
81 See In re Waters, 122 B.R. 298,301 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.) (expressing concern that such 
standard would serve as inducement for debtors to file for bankruptcy and that. consumer credit would dry 
up as consequence). 
82 See In re Ridner, 102 B.R. 247, 249 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989). 
83 H. REP. No. 95-595, at 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913 (emphasis added). 
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At least one court has criticized this standard because, although it is supported by 
a legislative history that wished to save debtors the expense of replacing the 
redeemed item, it nevertheless served as an inducement for debtors to file for 
bankruptcy just to write down their debts by the amount of transaction costs of a 
sale.84 
In defining the standard of commercially reasonable sale, Judge Leif Clark, in 
In re Waters, 85 refused to increase the redemption price because the secured party 
was a used furniture seller that could obtain a retail price. 86 Judge Clark pointed 
out that a retail sale involves the overhead of a sales force and show room, the cost 
of a warranty and of secured financing offered to buyers. These expenses had to be 
subtracted in order to obtain the redemption price under section 722. Instead of the 
commercially reasonable disposition, Judge Clark chose a price that represented what 
the secured party would have turned over to an owner of furniture who consigned 
it to the secured party for sale-a lesser amount. 87 
The most pro-creditor courts insist on replacement value of the item-though 
reduced by the overhead, sales commissions, and profit.88 This, of course; reduces 
replacement value into something resembling wholesale value.89 At least one court 
has charged what the debtor would have to pay a willing seller to buy the collateral. 
This approach puts the secured party in a better position than she would be in a 
foreclosure posture, because it gives the secured party those amounts saved because 
a foreclosure sale was unnecessary.90 
Often, valuation of property the debtor will redeem is not contested by secured 
creditors because the amount at stake does not warrant the lawyer's time to show 
up in court. As a result, debtors have moved to value collateral at impossibly low 
amounts hoping that the motion will not be contested.91 To combat these bad faith 
valuations, Judge Paul Lindsey imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the debtor's lawyer 
of 50 percent of the difference between the debtor's bad faith value and the "true" 
vallie imposed by the court.92 
84 See Penick, 170 B.R. at 917. 
85 122 B.R. 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.). 
86 See id. at 300-01 (finding that debtor is permitted to redeem property at value substantially equivalent 
to price yielded by commercially reasonable sale). 
87 See id. at 303. 
88 See McQuinn v. Dial Fin. Co. (In re McQuinn), 6 B.R. 899,900 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980) (Crawford, J.) 
(determining replacement value as retail value less dealer's overhead, salesman's commissions and dealer's 
profit). 
89 See id. at 900 (suggesting calculation for replacement value); see also Steven L. Pottle, Note, Bankruptcy 
Valuation Under Selected Liquidation Provisions, 40 VAND. L. REv. 177, 220 (I 987) (noting that 
replacement value minus commissions and dealer profit equals wholesale value). 
90 See Catholic Credit Union v. Siegler (In re Siegler), 5 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Minn. I 980) (Owens, J.) 
(valuation set at liquidation value plus two-thirds of difference between liquidation and retail value). 
91 See In re Ridner, 102 B.R. 247, 250 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989) (Lindsey, J.) (discussing need to 
discourage insupportable low valuations). 
92 See id. at 250. 
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E. Timing of Valuation 
Valuation is a function of time,93 and so one must consider as of when the 
collateral is valued. As we shall see, section 521(2) more or less requires a debtor 
to declare an intention to redeem within 30 days of bankruptcy and to perform 
within forty-five days after that.94 The amount of time implied in section 521(2) 
is therefore perhaps economically insignificant. Still, automobiles crash and home 
furnishings might be involved in accidents, in which case, substantial depreciation 
might manifest itself. 
In the previous section, two sources of valuation standards were 
identified-section 506(a) and section 522(a)(2). Neither applied to redemption by 
their terms. It is significant that section 506(a) notoriously sets no timing rule. But 
section 522(a)(2) does-the time of the bankruptcy petition.95 In any case, courts 
seem to favor section 506(a) as the governing rule in redemption cases, in spite of 
its technical inapplicability. That section sets no timing rule. Some of the cases 
that have addressed the timing issue have valued collateral as it existed on the day 
of the bankruptcy petition.96 Such a timing rule makes the debtor responsible for 
any damage done to the collateral after the bankruptcy petition has been filed.97 It 
accords with at least one theory of adequate protection that the secured party has a 
right to it once the bankruptcy proceeding has commenced.98 A few other courts 
have adopted the rule of "here and now," thereby relieving the debtor of 
responsibility for depreciation between the bankruptcy petition and valuation. 99 
Such a timing rule may not interact well with the secured party's right of adequate 
protection. Secured parties are supposed to be protected against postpetition 
93 See generally. David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, or, 
When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 113 (1992) (explaining effect of time on 
valuation process). 
94 See supra note 23-24 and accompanying text. 
95 Section 522(a)(2) also specifies that, when exempt property is not initially property of the estate, the 
timing rule should be the time at which the bankruptcy estate acquired the exempt item (prior to the debtor's 
actual exemption ofit). This supplemental rule contemplates a bankruptcy trustee's postpetition recovery of 
exempt property under an avoidance power. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), (h) (1994). 
96 See Taylor v. Albany Gov't Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 146 B.R. 41, 43 n.3 (M.D. Ga. 
1992) (Fitzpatrick, J.) (requiring value be assessed at time petition is filed), rev 'don other grounds sub nom. 
Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993); Kinser v. Otasco, Inc. 
(In re Kinser), 17 B.R. 468,469 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Norton, J.) (holding that any redemption must be 
for fair market value as of time petition is filed); In re Adams, 2 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980) 
(Proctor, J.) (declaring that in light of creditors reasonable expectations relevant date for valuation is day 
petition is filed). 
97 See In re King, 75 B.R. 287, 290 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (Sellers, J.) (implying that needed repairs 
which caused collateral's value to decline since petition was filed was debtor's responsibility). 
98 See Carlson, supra note 93, at 115-27. 
99 See King, 75 B.R. at 290; van Holt v. Commerce Bank of Bolivar (In re van Holt), 28 B.R. 577, 578 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (Pelofsky, J.) (using time of hearing for valuation); Pierce v. Industrial Savs. Co. 
(In re Pierce), 5 B.R. 346, 347 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980) (Crawford, J.) (noting that using filing date would 
place creditor in better position than it would have been had it repossessed in ordinary course). 
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depreciation. Yet courts are quite divided over when adequate protection rights 
begin. 100 Many courts . believe that the secured party has no right to adequate 
protection unless she asks for it by moving to lift the automatic stay. 101 When no 
such request has been made, this theory of adequate protection requires that the 
secured party take the loss. 102 On the other hand, some courts think that the right 
to adequate protection is automatic. 103 If such a theory is followed, the secured 
party may have a superpriority remedy against the bankruptcy estate for failed 
adequate protection. 104 
Even if a court believes that a secured creditor is entitled to adequate protection 
immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, courts often require that the 
section 507(b) superpriority for failed adequate protection be coupled with a 
showing that the depreciation expense benefited the estate within the meaning of 
section 503(b ). 105 Where the debtor has personally banged up the collateral and 
caused extra amounts of depreciation, such a showing may be difficult to establish, 
because such depreciation has hardly benefited the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, a 
secured party might have a difficult time recovering on the theory that adequate 
protection of the collateral has not been provided. 
II. REINSTATEMENT OF SECURITY AGREEMENTS COMPARED 
A. Lump Sum Redemption 
( . 
Can an individual debtor redeem property through installment payments, or must 
redemption occur by livery of a single lump sum? When courts consider classic 
redemption under section 722, they tend to require a lump sum payment from the 
debtor. 106 In Bell, Judge Robert Krupansky ruled that only lump sum payments 
rno See Carlson, supra note 93, at 115-25 (discussing different approaches to determining when adequate 
protection rights commence). 
rni See In re Hinckley, 40 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.) (requiring secured creditor to 
ask for adequate protection), See also Carlson, supra note 93, 142-43 (discussing cases requiring secured 
creditor to request adequate protection). 
rnz See Carlson, supra note 93, at 115-25. 
103 See, e.g, Lincoln Nat'! Life Ins. Co. v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. (In re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp.), 
98 B.R. 250, 255 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (Anderson, J.) (providing that secured creditor is entitled to 
adequate protection from commencement of case); see also Carlson, supra note 93, at 142-44 (discussing 
cases which find adequate protection when petition is filed). 
104 See Carlson, supra note 93, at 115-25. 
rns See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 865-66 (4th Cir. 1994) (Michael, J.); Smith v. 
Dairymen, Inc. (In re Smith), 75 B.R. 365, 369-70 (W.D. Va. 1987) (Michael, J.); In re Plunkett, 191 B.R. 
768, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995) (Clevert, C.J.); In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 166 B.R. 3, 8-9 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1994) (Queenan, J.), affd sub nom. Baybank-Middlesex v. Ralar Distribs., Inc. (In re Ralar Distribs., 
Inc.), 182 B.R. 81 (D. Mass.), ajf'd, 69 F.3d 1200 (1st Cir. 1995). 
rn6 Some early cases asserted that§ 722 authorizes redemption by installment. See van Holt v. Commerce 
Bank ofBolivar (In re van Holt), 28 B.R. 577,578 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (Pelofsky, J.) (permitting debtor 
to redeem collateral in installments, provided debtor complies with all other terms and conditions of 
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could be used to redeem collateral. 107 Judge Krupansky thought that, otherwise, 
the reaffirmation agreements described in section 524(c) would be reduced to an 
"exercise in legislative futility. "108 Furthermore, he observed that chapter 7 is ill 
equipped to supervise the installments, as the case may end before the last 
installment is due. 109 
When Bell is combined with the view that the automatic stay must always be 
lifted if there is no debtor equity and no reorganization, 110 the secured party is 
empowered to repossess the collateral as soon as the court orders the stay to be 
lifted. Repossession under state law, of course, requires a default by the debtor. 
Typically, a security agreement defines a bankruptcy petition as an event of 
default. 111 Whereas these "ipso facto" clauses are declared void in bankruptcy,112 
they are or ought to be perfectly good under state law. 113 
underlying agreement and pays interest while redeeming); In re Carroll, 7 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981) 
(Maggiore, J.) (permitting installments directly under§ 722, provided interest on value of automobile was 
paid); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hall (In re Hall), 11 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980) (Pelofsky, J.) 
(permitting redemption by installment). 
107 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), .700 F.2d 1053, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(Krupansky, J.). In Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989), Judge Moore 
distinguished Bell on the grounds that Bell dealt with redemption, and West dealt with an injunction 
preventing repossession by the secured party, so long as the debtor continued to meet payments required by 
the prepetition security agreement. See id. at 1547 n.7. 
rns See Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056; see also In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, 
J.) (declining to follow Lowry reasoning). 
109 See Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056; see also HESSLING, supra note 4, at 331-33. 
Other courts reject the availability of chapter 13 as a reason why debtors should not retain collateral so 
long as the debtor meets the payments required under a prepetition security agreement. According to Judge 
John Butzner in Home Owners Funding Corp. of America v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345 (4th 
Cir. 1992), "Chapter 13 envisions a new arrangement among the debtor and creditors, not a continuation of 
a contract to which the creditor and debtor have already agreed." See id. at 349. This may be true, but the 
installment idea is undoubtedly present in chapter 13, which undoubtedly becomes a powerful alternative to 
lump sum redemptions. 
110 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1994). 
111 Bankruptcy ipso facto clauses "are based on the premise that a bankruptcy discharge causes a material 
change in the contract between lender and borrower." See In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 470, 474 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1995) (Federman, J.). For a review of the Bankruptcy Code's regulation of ipso facto clause, arguing 
that such a clause is valid when collateral is outside the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, see Ned W. 
Waxman, Redemption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor's Exclusive Means of Retaining Possession of Collateral 
in Chapter 7, 56 U. Pm. L. REV. 187, 199-201 (1994). 
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 54l(c)(l)(B) (providing that any property interest of debtor becomes property of estate 
notwithstanding existence of ipso facto or bankruptcy provision). 
113 In In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994), the security agreement did not have an ipso facto 
clause in it. See id. at 684. Meanwhile, the debtors had failed, per§ 521(2), to indicate whether they would 
redeem, reaffirm or surrender, but they did indicate that they intended to remain current on the obligation. 
See id. The secured party did not wish to terminate the automatic stay because no default existed under state 
law. See id. Instead, the secured party sought to have the chapter and case '!dismissed" as to itself 
only-whatever that may have meant. See id. Judge Christopher Klein ruled that lifting the automatic stay 
is the sole remedy for violation of§ 521(2) and therefore declined to "dismiss" the case as to the secured 
party. In re Weir, 173 B.R. at 693. 
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B. Reinstatement 
Although redemption under section 722 requires lump sum payments, at least 
two Circuit Courts of Appeals have permitted installment payments on quite a 
different theory. In these two circuits-the Fourth and the Tenth-debtors can, in 
effect, reinstate the security agreement over the opposition of the secured party. 114 
This is a privilege accorded debtors in reorganization. 115 The reorganization 
chapters each have a provision specifically authorizing reinstatement. 116 Chapter 
7 has no such provision. 
The history of this policy begins with Riggs National Bank v. Perry (In re 
Perry), 117 where a secured party moved to lift the automatic stay in order to 
repossess an automobile based on a lack of adequate protection with regard to the 
collateral. 118 Judge Albert Bryan implied that, so long as the debtor met the 
installment payments, the secured party was adequately protected. 119 This ruling 
basically guaranteed the debtor the right to keep the car in exchange for installment 
payments. Judge Bryan conceded that a choice must be made eventually between 
reaffirming the security agreement under section 524( c) and redeeming the property 
under section 722. 120 The deadline for this choice, he thought, was the granting 
or denial of discharge, because at that time the automatic stay lapses. 121 He did not 
Another case in which the security agreement contained no ipso facto clause is In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 
470 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). In this case, Judge Arthur Federman ruled that the debtor had the option under 
Missouri law to cure the default by bringing the debt current: since the secured part had not taken action to 
"accelerate" the debt when payments were late. See id. at 477. Therefore, Judge Federman granted the 
debtor's motion to "reaffirm" the security agreement upon cure of the default. See id. at 477. This was not 
reaffirmation under§ 524(c), since the secured party refused to cooperate. See id. at 476. Nor was it even 
reaffirmation within the meaning of§ 521(2) since that latter section applies to consumer debtors and the 
debtors were farmers. See id. Rather, it was in the nature of a declaratory relief that, if certain payments were 
made, no defaults would exist under state law. See Thomas, 186 B.R. at 477. The debtors hoped the chapter 
7 trustee would abandon the mortgaged premise back to them, and then they would just keep payments 
current on the mortgage. See id. at 472. 
114 The seminal cases are Home Owners Funding Corp. of America v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 
345, 348 (4th Cir. 1992) (Butzner, J.) and Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 n.7 
(10th Cir. 1989) (Moore, J.). A Seventh Circuit case hints that a bankruptcy court has discretion, but is not 
required, to follow the Lowry case. In In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990), Judge Richard Cudahy 
remarked, "Lowry, of course, is distinguishable because here the bankruptcy court did not exercise its 
discretion to permit retention of collateral without reaffirmation." See id. at 1386. While he went on to 
criticize Lowry's view of§ 521, he did not suggest that the Lowry injunction was contrary to law. 
115 On reinstatement in reorganization, see David Gray Carlson, Rake's Progress: Cure and Reinstatement 
of Security Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. (1996) (forthcoming). 
116 See 11 U.S.C. §1124, 1225(b)(5), 1325(b)(5). 
117 729 F.2d 982 (4th Cir. 1984). 
118 See id. at 983-84. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 986. 
121 See Riggs, 729 F.2d at 986 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C)). Some courts have denied that grant or 
denial of discharge is the deadline for redemption. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
306 AB/ LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:289 
decide, however, whether section 722 redemptions might be accomplished by 
installment payments. But, in the meantime, the installment payments provided for 
in the security agreement constituted adequate protection and these payments 
reduced the secured claim over time. 122 
If the installment payments constitute adequate protection, the secured party 
cannot obtain the removal of the automatic stay under section 362( d)(l) which 
authorizes removal "for cause, including the lack of adequate protection." But what 
of section 362(d)(2)?123 This latter provision requires removal if "(A) the debtor 
does not have an equity in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to 
an effective reorganization." 124 We are in the realm of overencumbered collateral 
in chapter 7 liquidations. Therefore, in Riggs, section 362(d)(2) should have been 
a valid alternative ground for lifting the automatic stay. Extraordinarily, Judge 
Bryan held that section 362(d)(2) does not apply to security interests on personal 
property: 
While this clearly applies to real property mortgage foreclosures, we cannot 
believe the Congress intended that we modify a section 362(a) stay every 
time the value of a debtor's personal property drops below the balance due 
on the outstanding loan. 125 
Judge Bryan cited the legislative history, 126 which in illustrating the mechanics of 
section 362( d)(2), happened to assume that the collatyral might be real estate. 127 
From this he drew the dubious lesson that Congress intended that section 362(d)(2) 
could never apply in personal property cases. 128 Taken seriously, this remark 
implies that a bankruptcy trustee may always retain personal property collateral even 
though no reorganization is afoot and even though the collateral is oveiencumbered. 
The automatic stay dissolves of its own accord once the trustee abandons 
overencumbered collateral129 and once a discharge is granted. 130 Therefore, Riggs 
122 See Riggs, 729 F.2d at 984 (noting that because defendant was making payment plaintiff was not in any 
more precarious position than customary). 
123 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). 
124 See id. 
125 Riggs, 729 F.2d at 985. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 5791). 
128 See id. at 987-88 (Widener, J.,_ concurring and dissenting). Judge Emory Widener dissented because the 
district court had negated the bankruptcy court's order that the debtor continue to stay current on installment 
payments related to the car. In short, he agreed with the majority that § 362( d)(2) is not of a binding nature. 
See id. 
129 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(l). 
130 See id. § 362(c)(2)(C). If property is abandoned and the discharge is not yet granted, it would appear 
that the automatic stay still continues, because § 362(c)(5) prevents "any act to create, perfect, or enforce 
against property of the debtor any lien ... "In contrast,§ 362(c)(l) eliminates the stay as to property of the 
estate, but does not eliminate the stay as to property of the debtor. 
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benefits a debtor only during the pendency of the automatic stay. 131 The secured 
creditor in Riggs had argued that the automatic stay should be lifted simply because 
the bankruptcy proceeding itself was an event of default under the security 
agreement. 132 Judge Bryan quite properly ruled that default could never, standing 
alone, serve to justify lifting the stay. 133 
Seizing upon this holding, the debtor in Wilson v. Colonial American National 
Bank (In re Wilson), 134 claimed that Riggs stands for the proposition that defaults 
based on bankruptcy petitions (ipso facto clauses) were entirely illegal even outside 
of bankruptcy. 135 On this view, once the automatic stay dissolved of its own 
accord, the security agreement had to be viewed as not in default. Accordingly, a 
debtor could retain collateral so long as she continued to meet the payments under 
the contract. Judge Ross Krumm, however, refused to extend Riggs beyond the 
pendency of the automatic stay' s natural life, 136 and so the secured party was 
presumably free to repossess the collateral as soon as the automatic stay had 
dissipated. 137 
Riggs, however, may have been extended beyond its narrow scope in Home 
Owners Funding Corp. of America v. Belanger (In re Belanger). 138 In Belanger, 
a secured party tried to force a debtor to declare whether the debtor, who wished to 
retain collateral, would redeem it or would negotiate a reaffirmation agreement with 
the secured party under section 524( c ). 139 Judge A. Thomas Small read Riggs as 
131 See Henderson, supra note 44, at 164. According to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003(a), a 
creditors' meeting should be set within forty days of the petition-probably a reference to Noah in Genesis. 
After this meeting, creditors have sixty days to object to discharge. The discharge is supposed to be granted 
promptly thereafter, unless an adversary proceeding has begun over the discharge. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 
4004( c ). Of course, throughout the process the court has authority to extend the time limits, and so the debtor 
has a certain incentive to stall before actually obtaining the discharge. If the debtor succeeds, the benefit of 
Riggs can be extended. 
132 See Riggs, 729 F.2d at 984 (invalidating clause of sales agreement that would cause debtor to be in 
default if they filed for bankruptcy). 
l 33 See id. at 984-85. 
134 97 B.R. 285 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989). 
135 See id. at 287. 
136 See Wilson, 97 B.R. at 287-88. Judge Widener's concurring opinion in Riggs specifically stated that, so 
far as he was concerned, the majority opinion did not imply that the ipso facto clause was invalid under state 
law. See Riggs, 729 F.2d at 987. 
137 Eaton v. First American Bank, 134 B.R. 178 (E.D. Va. 1991), is probably in accord with Wilson. In 
Eaton, the debtor had obtained some sort of court order stating that a secured party could not repossess the 
collateral so long as the debtor stayed current on payments required by a prepetition security agreement. See 
id. at 178. Judge Rebecca Beach Smith did not say whether the order purported to extent beyond the natural 
life of the automatic stay. She reversed, however, on the theory that the debtor was attempting to redeem by 
installments which was not allowed. See id. at 180-81. She did say that, if the security agreement was not 
in default, the debtor could retain the collateral but declined to rule on whether such a default exists. Riggs 
was cited for the proposition that, if the security agreement was not in default, the debtor could stay in 
possession-an obvious state-law proposition. See id. at 179 n.2. 
138 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992). 
139 See id. at 346. This was done under the jurisdiction of§ 521(2), added by Congress in 1984, after the 
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holding that ipso facto clauses were not valid--"the very extension Judge Krumm 
refused to make. 140 Judge Small then granted a discharge, which would have 
ended the automatic stay. Under a narrow reading of Riggs, the secured party 
should have been able to repossess the collateral, provided the security agreement 
contained an ipso facto clause. 
On appeal, Judge John Butzner affirmed, emphasizing that the debtor could 
retain the collateral if not in default. 141 He did not indicate whether the debtor was 
in default. 142 But in affirming Judge Small's opinion,· Judge Butzner could be 
taken as ruling that ipso facto clauses are invalid even outside bankruptcy. 143 
This same view was expressly taken in Lowry Federal Credit Union v. 
West, 144 where Judge John P. Moore upheld an injunction preventing a secured 
party from repossessing collateral so long as the debtor made current payments on 
its prepetition security agreement. 145 This order specifically extended beyond the 
natural life of the automatic stay. 146 Although Judge Moore denied that he was 
declaring the security agreement to be free of default, in spite of the presence of an 
ipso facto clause, 147 no other interpretation seems available to explain why the 
debtor is entitled t~ an injunction that endures beyond the termination of the 
automatic stay. 148 Judge Moore also hinted that no evidence existed that the 
collateral would depreciate faster than the amortization rate of the debt; 149 such 
evidence, if it existed, might therefore count as an argument against such an 
injunction in the Tenth Circuit. 
The Lowry holding should be compared to the treatment of an executory 
contract with an ipso facto clause in it. According to section 365, a trustee can 
assume and cure an executory contract, in spite of the presence of an ipso facto 
Riggs decision was handed down. See discussion infra Part III. 
140 See In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368,369 n.1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.), affd sub nom. Home Owners Funding 
Corp. of Am. v. Belanger, 128 B.R. 142 (E.D.N.C. 1990), aff'd, 962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992). Actually, the 
security agreement was not introduced into evidence. See id. Judge Small simply observed that, if the security 
agreement contained an ipso facto clause, it was utterly invalid. See id. Most security agreements, however, 
can be counted on to have ipso facto and acceleration clauses. Waxman, supra note 111, at 187 n.2. 
141 See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 
1992). 
142 See id. at 348. 
143 See id. at 347. 
144 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989). 
145 See id. at 1547. 
146 See id. at 1543. 
147 See id. at 1546 n.5. 
148 See In re Laubacher, 150 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (Williams, J.) (following Lowry 
reasoning in real estate case); see also In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 470, 473-77 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) 
(Federman, J.) (stating in dictum that in that agreement had no ipso facto clause); In re Parlato, 185 B.R. 
413, 417 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (Krechevsky, J.) (denying secured party's motion for order to compel 
reaffirmation, redemption or surrender and agreeing with Lowry 's reasoning). 
149 See Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (reasoning there was nothing in record indicating depreciation would occur 
particularly rapidly). 
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clause. 150 A trustee may also sell the executory contract to a third party for 
value. 151 Once this occurs, the ipso facto clause cannot be asserted against the 
assignee as an excuse for the contract creditor not to perfonn. 152 Lowry in effect 
provides the same treatment for security agreements, even though they are 
"executed," not "executory," contracts. 153 Thus, Lowry allows a debtor to assume 
and cure a security agreement over the opposition of a secured creditor, a right the 
Bankruptcy Code expressly gives to debtors in reorganization. 154 A key distinction 
would exist, though, between classic cure of a loan agreement in reorganization and 
the theory that Lowry sets forth. In reorganization cases, if a contract is cured and 
reinstated, it is not discharged. 155 The debtor would be personally liable on it if 
the contract later goes into default. 156 The Lowry theory should have no such 
implication. The debtor is discharged, and the secured party's repossession is 
simply enjoined so long as the debtor stays current on the loan agreement. If the 
debtor defaults, the secured party has no in personam remedies against the debtor, 
but the collateral itself is collateral for the full prepetition amount of the claim. 
, Professor Joann Henderson has suggested that waiver and estoppel support the 
Lowry result. That is, by voluntarily accepting payments on the installment contract, 
a secured party admits that the security agreement is not in default. 157 Lowry, 
however, goes further than an estoppel theory, because the Lowry injunction can 
prevent repossession even if the creditor refuses to accept any payment. Henderson 
further suggests that Lowry replicates what a debtor might do surreptitiously anyway. 
Suppose a debtor filing for bankruptcy simply does not schedule a secured party 
claiming collateral. So long as the secured party remains in the dark, the debtor 
might keep current on installments, using postpetition earnings, thereby retaining the 
collateral. 158 If a debtor is likely to achieve this result by stealth, why not permit 
the debtor to accomplish the same end in the light of day? 
Because Lowry establishes a right to assume and cure, it should be apparent that 
the entire claim of an undersecured party must be paid-not just the post-bifurcation 
150 See l l U.S.C. § 365(b)(l) (1994) (allowing trustee to assume executory contract provided she cure but 
no cure required for breach of ipso facto clause). 
151 See id. § 365(f). 
152 See id. § 365(f)(3). 
153 See Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546; see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916, 
917 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (defining "executory" contract as "a contract under which the obligation of 
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other"). 
154 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1222(b)(3), 1222(b)(5), l322(b)(3), l322(b)(5) (allowing debtor to provide for 
curing or waiving of default under chapters 11, 12 and 13 respectively). 
155 See, e.g., General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25 B.R. 987, 
998 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (Mabey, J.) (allowing debtor to cure and reinstate contract leaving creditor 
unpaired). · 
156 See ll U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(l), 1228(c)(l), 1328(a)(l), l328(c)(l). 
157 See Henderson, supra note 44, at 16.8-69; contra In re Whitaker, 85 B.R. 788, 794 n.13 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1988). · 
158 See Henderson, supra note 44, at 172. 
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secured claim, based upon a valuation of the collateral. 159 This may be compared 
to section 722, which allows for the redemption of collateral if the amount of the 
"allowed secured claim" is paid. 
It follows, then, that Riggs and West do not really deal with redemption under 
section 722 at all. They do, however, deal with the automatic stay, with the validity 
of ipso facto clauses or with specific injunctions that are separate from the automatic 
stay. 
C. Chapter 13 and Chapter 20 
In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 160 Judge Robert 
Krupansky ruled that redemption under section 722 must be accomplished by a lump 
sum payment. Ominously, he also suggested: 
Debtors posit that preclusion of installment redemption will precipitate 
situations wherein a Chapter 7 debtor will possess no viable method of 
retaining possession of secured collateral. However, a debtor may avoid 
such an untenuous'"position by initially filing a petition for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 13 or converting an existing Chapter 7 proceeding to a Chapter 13 
proceeding. 161 
This passage could be read as inviting debtors to file for chapter 13 with no 
intention of completing the plan-only completing enough payments to disencumber 
collateral before converting to chapter 7. 162 Conversion to chapter 7 is a chapter 
13 debtor's right163-though courts may Jind offense and cause to discipline 
debtors who so abuse chapter 13. 164 
Another possibility, however, presents itself to debtors-the chapter 20 option. 
Chapter 20 refers to a chapter 7 proceeding coupled by a quick chapter 13 filing. 
These two chapters are thus wittily summed together to produce "chapter 20." 
According to this strategy, the chapter 7 proceeding results in a debtor's 
discharge from any unsecured deficit claim of a secured party. The collateral is then 
abandoned to the secured party, who is now a nonrecourse creditor. Before the 
foreclosure sale, however, the debtor files the chapter 13 plan. Under a chapter 13 
plan, the debtor may have the collateral valued (as in redemption). The debtor may 
159 See In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682, 684-85 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (Kelly, C.J.) (suggesting that, where 
installment plan is allowed in chapter 7, debtor would have to pay both secured and unsecured deficit claim 
because such plan is not redemption). 
160 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J.). 
161 Id. at 1057. 
162 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 51. 
163 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (1994). 
164 See id. § 707. 
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then pay that value to the secured party over time. 165 Chapter 13 plans may last 
.three (and with court permission, up to five) years. 166 Of course, the debtor must 
qualify for chapter 13, by having a regular income, unsecured debts of less than 
$250,000 and secured debts of less than $750,000. 167 
Chapter 20 has received an endorsement of sorts by the Supreme Court in 
Johnson v. Home State Bank. 168 In this case, the collateral was a home. After the 
mortgage was changed into a nonrecourse claim in chapter 7, the debtor filed for 
chapter 13 and proposed to retire the mortgage (for the value of the house) over 
time. 169 The creditor, inter alia, protested that sequential proceedings were unfair. 
But, wrote Justice Thurgood Marshall: 
We disagree. Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial 
filings. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109(g) (no filings within 180 days of 
dismissal); § 727(a)(8) (no Chapter 7 filing within six years of a Chapter 7 
or Chapter 11 filing); § 727(a)(9) (limitation on Chapter 7 filing within six 
years of Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 filing). The absence of a like prohibition 
on serial filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, combined with the 
evident care with which Congress fashioned these express prohibitions, 
convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the 
benefit of Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for 
Chapter 7 relief. 170 
Justice Marshall went on, however, to suggest that the chapter 13 plan had to be 
founded in good faith, 171 leaving open the possibility that crude chapter 20 
strategies might still fall apart. Some courts have found that mere ability to achieve 
the chapter 13 plan proves that it is in good faith. 172 To be distinguished is the 
slightly different question of whether the chapter 13 petition (not the plan) was filed 
in good faith. Some courts seem open to the chapter 20 strategy in general. 173 It 
has been suggested that sequential petitions are not per se bad faith, per Johnson, 
but that they are evidence of bad faith and might help justify dismissal. 174 It has 
also been suggested that good faith is never grounds to dismiss a bankruptcy 
165 See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
166 See id. §§ 1222(d), 1322(d). 
167 See id. § I 09( e ). 
168 501 U.S. 78 (1991). 
169 The court even permitted no principal payments and a balloon payment at the end of the plan. See id. 
at 81. 
170 See id. at 87. 
171 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) ("the plan has been filed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law"). 
172 See, e.g., Society Nat') Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (Martin, J.); see 
generally Henderson, supra note 44, at 173-80. 
173 See In re Manderson, 121 B.R. 617 •(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (Wright, J.). 
174 See Blatnick v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 198 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (Bowie, J.); In re 
Herrera, 194 B.R. 178, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (Squires, J.). 
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petition-rather, it is grounds only to reject a plan or lift the automatic stay for 
"cause. "175 
The greatest utility of the chapter 20 strategy had been with regard to home 
mortgages. Thus, a home might be "redeemed" for its value in chapter 13. Section 
1322(b )(2) prevents the modification of claims secured by home mortgages. A 
prominent school of thought held that, while the "secured claim" could not be 
modified, the unsecured deficit ( discharged in the earlier chapter 7 case) certainly 
could. This premise was destroyed by the Supreme Court in Nobe/man v. American 
Savings Bank, 176 which held that the entire mortgage debt had to be paid-not just 
the value of the house. 177 Nevertheless, chapter 20 remains a viable alternative to 
redeem personal property on the installment plan. Thus, even if a court refuses a 
Lowry-style injunction unilaterally reinstating the security agreement, 178 a chapter 
20 strategy might achieve largely the same thing. 
Ill. SECTION 521(2) AND ITS EFFECT 
In 1984, Congress added section 521(2) to the Bankruptcy Code with the idea 
of forcing the debtor either to redeem or settle with the secured party through a 
postpetition "reaffirmation" agreement. 179 Section 521(2) requires a consumer 
debtor to file, within thirty days of bankruptcy, a statement of intent to retain or 
surrender180 collateral. 181 If the former, the debtor must state her intention, "if 
175 See In re Victoria Ltd. Partnership, 187 B.R. 54 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (Queenan, J.). 
176 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Thomas, J.). 
177 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 14-16. 
178 See supra notes 114-159 and accompanying text. 
179 According to § 521(2): 
if an individual debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are 
secured by property of the estate-
(A) within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 ... or 
on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such 
additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the 
clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property 
and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends 
to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such 
property. 
(B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or 
within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, 
the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by 
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and 
(C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor's or 
the trustee's rights with regard to such property under this title. 
11 u.s.c. § 521(2) (1994). 
180 See In re Logan, 124 B.R. 729, 735 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (Cole, J.) (reasoning that where debtor's 
ex-husband has taken collateral, debtor has no duty to get it back so intention to surrender can be 
effectuated); In re Bayless, 78 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (Waldron, J.) (finding that loss of 
possession did not excuse debtor's failure to file statement of intent); cf In re McKinney, 199 B.R. 43, 45-46 
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applicable," to redeem the property under section 722 or reaffirm an agreement with 
the creditor under section 524(c)-a process which requires the secured party to 
agree. 182 If the debtor chooses to surrender or retain the property, the debtor has 
forty-five additional days to execute that intention. 183 All time periods are capable 
of being extended by the court. 184 If the debtor files the proper statement of intent, 
the statement itself serves as a reason· not to lift the automatic stay upon motion of 
the secured party. 185 
Section 521(2), by its terms, has been taken to imply that its effect is limited to 
chapter 7 bankruptcies. 186 Thus, the statement of intent must be filed "within thirty 
days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 ... or on or before the 
date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier. "187 
Oddly, a few chapter 13 references to section 521(2) exist. Section 
1302(b)(1)188 requires a chapter 13 trustee to perform the duties listed in section 
704(3). 189 Section 704(3), in turn, requires the trustee to "ensure that the debtor 
shall perform his intention as specified in section 521(2)(B)." 190 Section 
1307(c)(10)191 makes the debtor's failure to file a section 521(2) grounds for a 
chapter 13 trustee to move for the conversion of a chapter 13 case to chapter 7 or 
the outright dismissal of the chapter 13 petition, though it also indicates that only 
the chapter 13 trustee may make a motion to dismiss on such grounds. 192 
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (where debtor did not possess collateral at time of bankruptcy petition there was no need to 
file under § 521(2)). 
181 See II U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). 
182 See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1990) (Cudahy, J.); General Motors Acceptance Corp. 
v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J.). 
183 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B). Thus, where the debtor chooses to surrender the collateral, a creditor cannot 
force an earlier surrender than the forty-five days legislated in § 521(2)(B). See In re Grace, 85 B.R. 464, 
466-67 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (Seller, J.). The debtor has a right to retain the collateral for the full 45 day 
period regardless of a failure to file a statement of intention or a failure to surrender the collateral. See id. 
at 466; In re Simpson, 147 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1992) (Small, J.) (holding debtor not accountable 
under § 521(2)(B) for costs arising from alleged failure to fulfill her intention until full 45 day period had 
elapsed). · 
184 FED R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(I). Rule 9006(b)(I) allows the court, for cause, discretion to extend any time 
period specified by the bankruptcy rules before expiration of the period of after expirations of the period, 
where failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. See id. 
185 Cj CCNB Bank v. Elicker (In re Elicker), 100 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989) (Woodside, J.) 
(lifting stay because no statement of intent was filed); but see Logan, 124 B.R. at 734 (suggesting that appeal 
to trustee and order to force action by trustee was condition precedent to lifting stay). In In re McNeil, 128 
B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. E.D. 1991), Judge David Scholl ruled that failure to redeem or reaffirm within forty-
five days, per§ 521(2)(B), was not grounds to lift automatic stay as those options do not exhaust the debtor's 
menu for keeping the collateral. As to whether these options are exclusive, see infra notes 202-09 and 
accompanying text. 
186 See HESSLING, supra note 4, at 363 (stating that § 521(2) applies only in chapter 7 cases). 
187 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). 
188 Id. § 1302(b)(I). 
189 See id. 
190 See id. § 704(3). 
191 Id. § 1307(c)(10). 
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(10). While subsection (c) generally allows either "a party in interest" or "the 
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In this regard, it may be noted that section 521(2)'s deadline is thirty days after 
the chapter 7 petition or, alternatively, before the date of the creditor's meeting, 
whichever is earlier. 193 Chapter 13 is subject to the requirement of a creditor's 
meeting, just like chapter 7. 194 Perhaps, then, Congress intended section 521(2) to 
apply in chapter 13 after all. 195 Yet the requirement makes no sense. Chapter 13 
permits the debtor to retain all property-not just the property described in section 
722. 196 The requirement that the debtor state an intention whether to retain or 
surrender collateral is therefore nonsensical. The leading treatise on redemption 
states that the chapter 13 references to section 521(2) are "drafting errors," 197 but 
the specific reference in section 1307(c)(l0)-failure to file is grounds for 
dismissal-makes this judgment rather too boldly and peremptorily. It must be 
noted, however, that no court has ever tried to discipline a chapter 13 debtor for not 
filing under section 521(2). Perhaps this is because chapter 13 plans themselves 
must be filed before the section 521(2) statement is due, 198 and the plan should 
entirely duplicate the information section 521(2) tries to force. Indeed, the plan 
itself may be taken as the debtor's full compliance with section 521(2). 
Section 521(2) has been described as a "toothless" tiger. 199 Yet at least some 
courts have been willing to punish debtors for failing to comply with section 521(2). 
Some courts have entertained the dissolution of the automatic stay as a remedy.200 
United States Trustee" to convert to Chapter 7 or dismiss, paragraphs (9) and (10) limit such conversion or 
dismissal to action by the United States Trustee only. See id. § 1307(c)(9), (10). 
193 See id. § 521(2)(B). 
194 See id. § 34l(a) ("Within a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under this title, the United 
States trustee shall convene and preside over a meeting of creditors."). 
195 More confusingly, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1019(l)(B) implies that, when a chapter 13 
case is converted to chapter 7, the "statement of intention" presumably referring to the§ 521(2) statement, 
can be filed thirty days after the order of conversion, "if required." See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1019(l)(B). Such 
a rule seems to contradict the statute, if the reference to the creditors' :.,eeting can be taken to imply that 
§ 521(2) applies in chapter 13. 
196 See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b). 
197 See HESSLING, supra note 4, at 363. 
198 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b). Rule 3015(b) states: "[T]he debtor may file a chapter 13 plan with the 
petition. If a plan is not filed with the petition, it shall be filed within 15 days thereafter .... If a case is 
converted to chapter 13, a plan shall be filed within 15 days thereafter .... " Id. 
199 See In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682, 683 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992). Judge Christopher Klein goes on to observe: 
It is evident that section 521(2) bears scars from crippling wounds suffered in hard-fought battles. 
Its text is so enigmatic, particularly in light of the rejected version, that the most that can be said 
in its defense is that the Congress settled upon a calculated ambiguity to resolve an intractable 
difference of opinion. 
Id. at 685. In In re Weir, Judge Klein relates the story of how the Senate's version of§ 521(2), containing 
an automatic lapse of the stay, was greatly weakened by the House of Representatives. See id. at 684-89. 
200 See, e.g., CCB Bank v. Elicher (In re Elicher), 100 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989) (granting 
creditor's motion to lift automatic stay for failure of debtors to file statement of intention). See also In re 
Irvine, 192 B.R. 920, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (DeGunther, J.) (dictum); In re Tameling, 173 B.R. 627, 
628 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (Gregg, J.) (dictum); In re Bracamortes, 166 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
1994) (Hargrove, J.) (dictum); In re Weir, 173 B.R. at 690 (dictum). 
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Courts have issued orders "compelling" the debtor to file the requisite statement.201 
If the debtor does riot obey this order, sanctions-including dismissal of the chapter 
7 proceeding under section 707(a)-might follow. 202 
Other courts, however, ha:i rdused to dismiss a chapter 7 pr?ceeding as a 
remedy,203 have refused damages;204 or have refused to deny a discharge from 
unsecured claims. 205 Courts have denied that creditors even have standing to 
complain of the debtor's failure to comply with section 521(2), declaring instead that 
only the trustee has standing to do so.206 Courts have allowed redemption to 
proceed in spite of the debtor's failure to file a statement of intention, 207 
suggesting that the failure is meaningless. Judge Roland Brumbaugh has even 
201 See, e.g., Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Kennedy, 
137 B.R. 302 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (Scott, J.); In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991) 
(Fussel, J.); In re Chavarria, I 17 B.R. 582, 585 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (Pappas, J.). But see Irvine, 192 B.R. 
at 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (DeGunther, J.) (stating that motion to vacate automatic stay not motion to 
compel was proper remedy for debtor's failure to file statement of intention). 
202 See, e.g., In re Green, 119 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (Derby, J.); cf Tameling, I 73 B.R. at 628 
(Gregg, J.) (providing that finding debtor in contempt for failure to comply with order to amend statement 
of intention "is absurd and akin to swatting a mosquito with a sledgehammer"). 
203 See Weir, 173 B.R at 691-92; In re Crooks, 148 B.R. 867, 873 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). Section 
1307(c}(10) strangely makes failure to file a statement of intention grounds to dismiss a chapter 13 
proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. §1307(c)(10) (1994). It is, however, far from clear that§ 521(2) even applies to 
chapter 13. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. . 
204 See In re Manderson, 121 B.R. 617, 620-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990) (Wright; J.). 
205 See In re Logan, 124 B.R. 729, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (Cole, J.); National Bank of Commerce 
v. Barriger (In re Barriger), 61 B.R. 506, 508-10 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986) (Leffler, J.). 
206 See Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (Moore, J.); Crooks, 148 
B.R. at 872; Manderson, 121 B.R. at 621. Once again,§ 1307(c)(10} allows only the chapter 13 trustee [or 
debtor] to move for the conversion or dismissal of a chapter case, if the debtor fails to file a statement of 
intention. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). Though § 521(2) would not appear to be .relevant in chapter 13, the 
requirement bolsters the idea that only trustees have standing. 
There are also cases finding that creditors have standing to seek sanctions. See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1512; 
In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cuddahy, J.); Chavarria, 117 B.R. at 584-85 
(remarking that if creditor had no standing system would be "oddly inefficient"). 
A peculiar standing case is McLellan Fed. Credit Union v. Parker (In re Parker), 193 B.R. 525 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 1996) (Russell, J.), where the debtor and secured party agreed to reaffirm both a secured claim and 
an unrelated unsecured claim. See id. at 526-27. On behalf of the debtor, the bankruptcy court refused to 
approve of this reaffirmation, apparently, on the authority of Lowry and Belanger. See id. at 527. The secured 
party appealed, only to find that it was not an "aggrieved" party with standing to pursue the appeai. The court 
pointed out that such agreements could only be approved if in the debtor's best interest. See id. at 525. The 
debtor, however, had not appealed the reaffirmation refusal, proving that the agreement should not have been 
reaffirmed in the first place. See id. at 528. 
207 See In re Cassar, 139 B.R. 253 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992); In re Eagle, 51 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
1985); In re Hawkins, 136 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (allowing redemption subsequent to 
reaffirmation and after discharge order was entered). 
In Hawkins, Judge Ross Krumm allowed redemption after a discharge order was entered. See Hawkins, 
136 B.R. at 651 ("The Code is silent as to when the debtors must exercise their option to redeem under 11 
U.S.C. § 722."}. Why § 521(2)(8) does not constitute legislation on that question was not explained. 
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remarked that debtors "should not be overly concerned if they cannot meet the 
deadlines set forth in section 521 and other sections of the Code. 11208 
Some courts have questioned the standing of a creditor to seek sanctions when 
a debtor neglects to meet the deadlines in section 521 (2). Section 704(3) imposes 
on a chapter 7 trustee the duty to "insure that the debtor shall perform his intention 
as specified in section 521(2)(B) of this title." From this requirement courts have 
deduced that 09ly the trustee can enforce section 521(2)-not creditors.209 
Suppose a debtor, pursuant to section 521(2), elects to retain collateral but 
cannot negotiate a reaffirmation agreement with the secured party. In In re 
Crooks,210 a secured party reasoned that, since section 521(2) requires either 
reaffirmation or redemption, the debtor was forced to redeem upon the failure of 
reaffirmation.211 Judge Jack Schmetterer sensibly ruled that the debtor could 
change his mind.212 The debtor was allowed to surrender the collateral in lieu of 
making the lump sum payment, in spite of an earlier intent to retain it. 213 In In re 
Gregg,214 debtors who changed their minds near the end of the forty-five day 
period of section 521(2)(B) claimed they should have another forty-five days to 
surrender the collateral. Judge Frank Koger disagreed and awarded the secured 
party adequate protection payments starting from the time the forty-five day period 
ended.215 
Since section 521(2) was enacted in 1984, courts have been newly inspired to 
hold that unilateral reinstatement of the security agreement is not permitted. Rather, 
if the debtor wishes to retain the colla,teral in the absence of a bilateral reaffirmation, 
the debtor must redeem under section 722 by means of a lump sum payment.216 
In support of this view, note that section 521(2)(B) states: 
208 See Cassar, 139 B.R. at 254. This remark is based on inherent conflicts in the timing rules between 
§ 521(2) and objections to discharge of debt. See id. Since § 722 redemption requires a finding that the 
underlying secured claim is dischargeable, Judge Brumbaugh found it impossible for the court to find 
dischargeability of the underlying debt before the § 521(2) deadline had lapsed. See id. 
209 See In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.); In re Bayless, 78 B.R. 506, 
511 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (Waldron, J.); In re Williams, 64 B.R. 737, 738 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) 
(Perlman, J.). 
210 183 B.R. 867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). 
211 See id. at 872. 
212 See id. at 872-73. 
213 Accord Hawkins, 136 B.R at 649. 
214 199 B.R. 404 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996). 
215 See id. at 409. 
216 See Johnson v. Sun Fin. Co. (In re Sun Fin. Co.), 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Taylor v. 
AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993) (Dubina, J.); In re Edwards, 901 
F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J.); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Polk (In re Polk), 76 B.R 148, 150 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987) (Meyers, J.); Dever v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Dever), 164 B.R. 132, 136 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (Fenning, J.); In re Gerling, 175 B.R 295 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Tucker, 
158 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); In re Kennedy, 137 B.R. 302 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (Scott, J.); 
In re Chavarria, 117 B.R. 582, 584 n.2 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990) (Pappas, J.). 
~' 
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within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, 
or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five 
day period fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such 
property, as specified by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph .... 217 
317 
Redemption or reaffirmation can be performed in this forty-five day period, but 
retention on the installment plan probably cannot, thereby indicating a congressional 
intent to bar such a practice.218 Other courts reacting to section 521(2) have 
complained that the installment plan would put the creditor at the nonrecourse mercy 
of the debtor, who would have little incentive to take care of the collateral.219 
Debtors would never have the incentive to reaffirm with the creditor's consent if the 
debtor could unilaterally force a creditor to accept installments. 22° Furthermore, 
if redemption, reaffirmation or surrender were not the only options, there is no good 
explanation for why Congress even bothered to enact section 521(2).221 Finally, 
courts have not blushed to announce that the installment plan is a "head start, not 
a fresh start. "222 
According to this view, if the chapter 7 debtor ~ishes to retain the collateral and 
pay installments, she may do so only by reaffirming the security agreement in the 
postpetition agreement described in section 524( c ).223 This, however, requires the 
full consent and cooperation of the secured party, who may not be compelled to 
reinstate the security agreement.224 Thus, the only option for a debtor who wishes 
217 11 u.s.c. § 521(2)(8) (1994). 
218 See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516. 
219 See id. at 1516 (quoting Bank South, N.A. v. Home, (In re Home), 132 B.R. 661, 663-64 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1991) (Drake, J.)). 
Judge Robert Littlefield responds that such a view is "uninformed with regard to the realities of the 
typical chapter 7 case." See In re Boodrow, 192 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 197 B.R 409 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996). He thinks that, because chapter 7 debtors cannot replace their existing automobile, they 
have a great incentive to care for the vehicle, to the benefit of the secured party. See id. at 58. 
220 See Polk, 76 B.R. at 150; Kennedy, 137 B.R. at 304. 
221 See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516. 
222 See id. at 1516.; Debra S. Friedman, Comment, I I US.C. § 521(2)(A): Fresh Start or Head Start?, 22 
PAC. L.J. 1239 (1991). 
223 See Liberty Nat'! Bank & Trust v. Burba (In re Burba), No. 93-6479, 1994 WL 709314, at* 15 (6\h Cir. 
Nov. 10 1994)(Contie, J.); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cudahy, J.); General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 1983) (Krupansky, J.). 
In Burba, Judge Leroy Contie makes the point that if installments could be used to redeem property 
under§ 722, then a debtor would never have an incentive to reaffirm under§ 524(c), thereby rendering the 
latter provision superfluous-an interpretive no-no. See Burba, 1994 WL 709314, at* 15. That is, if collateral 
is overencumbered, the redemption price would always be cheaper than the reaffirmation price, and debtors 
would always choose to redeem. This is supposed to prove that installments are not allowed under § 722. 
Judge Contie, however, overlooks the fact that§ 524(c) still has utility, even if installments are possible 
under § 722. If a debtor equity exists in the collateral, and if the contract rate is lower than the market rate, 
then the debtor has an incentive to use § 524(c). Hence, installments under § 722 do not quite render 
§ 524( c) completely useless. 
224 See Polk, 76 B.R. at 150. 
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to pay installments is to file for chapter 13 and confirm a plan providing for such 
a mode of payment. 225 
These implications of section 521 (2) are belied, however, by section 521 (2)(C), 
which provides that "nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall 
alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with regard to such property under this 
title . . . "226 This subsection certainly suggests that whatever rights the debtor had 
before, she still has them after the enactment of section 521(2). Hence, section 
521(2)(C) cannot comprise a new excuse to rule against retention without 
redemption or reaffirmation. 227 · 
Other courts have ruled that, section 521(2) notwithstanding, a debtor might 
retain collateral by staying current on the prepetition security agreement.228 On this 
view, section 521 (2) requires the debtor to notify the secured party of her intention 
to redeem or reaffirm "if applicable. "229 This does not imply, however, that these 
225 See Bell, 700 F.2d at 1056 (stating that chapter 7 is poorly e·quipped to supervise debtor defaults on 
installments); In re Gerling, 175 B.R. 295, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (Federman, J.) (finding that debtor 
desiring retention without reaffirmation should file "under one of the reorganization chapters"). 
226 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C) (1994). 
227 See In re Harper, 143 B.R. 682, 684 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (Kelly, J.). According to a statement 
made by Congressman Peter Rodino, the purpose of§ 521(2) was to preserve the right of the debtor to 
exempt property and the right of the trustee to use avoidance powers. See 130 CONG. REC. 6204 (1984). 
Rodino did not list amongst his examples the right of a debtor to retain collateral so long as the prepetition 
terms of the agreement were being followed. 
228 See Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989) (Moore, J.) (finding court 
had jurisdiction to let debtor keep collateral while debtor kept current on debt); In re Boodrow, 192 B.R. 57, 
58 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (Littefield, J.) (allowing debtor to avoid making election while retaining 
collateral), ajf'd, 197 B.R. 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Harper, 143 B.R. at 684 (stating§ 521(2) permits debtor 
to retain collateral provided debtor remains current on payments as required by loan terms); In re Parker, 142 
B.R. 327,329 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992) (same); In re Manning, 129 B.R. 198, 199 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) 
(permitting debtor to retain collateral without reaffirmation); In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603, 608 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1991) (prohibiting creditor from repossessing collateral). 
The Collier treatise supports this line of reasoning by pointing out that earlier versions of§ 521(2) 
provided that the automatic stay would be deemed lifted if the debtor defaulted on her obligation to state her 
intentions to surrender or retain collateral. By eliminating this remedy, Congress is supposed to have revealed 
its intent that the debtor's options for retention are not limited to redemption or reaffirmation. See 3 COLLIER 
ON BANKRUPTCY, ,r 521.09A[5], at 521-48 to -49 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996). Professor Ned 
Waxman properly refers to the rejection of the automatic stay lapse as merely a procedural question-not one 
that goes to the substance of the debtor's right to retain collateral. Thus, nothing can be learned from the 
weakening of the remedy. See Waxman, supra note ll I, at 195-96. 
The Collier treatise has a better argument in pointing out that an earlier version of§ 521 (2) much more 
specifically limited a debtor's options than did the final version of§ 521(2). The earlier draft required the 
debtor to "perform his intention ... by surrendering such property to the creditor or the trustee, redeeming 
such property by paying the redemption price, or reaffirming the debt." H.R. 4786, 97th Cong. § 7 (1981). 
By rejecting this language for the less specific language of§ 521(2), Congress supposedly showed that it 
intended the debtor to have more options. See 3 COLLIER, supra, ,i 521.09A[5], at 521-49. Waxman responds 
that, if Congress intended for there to be more options, why didn't it say so? See. Waxman, supra note 111, 
at 196. Of course, it could be that Congress intended a "common law" of debtor rights to develop without 
its guidance. Hence, Professor Waxman does not score as effectively against Collier in this respect. 
229 See In re Boodrow, 192 B.R. at 58-59. 
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are the only options available. Otherwise, the phrase "if applicable" would be read 
out of the Bankruptcy Code. 230 In addition, it has been pointed out that debtors 
may avoid certain security interests under section 522(f)(l)(B);231 yet this option 
is not mentioned in section 521(2). This omission implies that section 521(2) was 
not intended to limit the debtor's options to exemption, redemption and 
reaffirmation.232 Thus, even after section 521(2), courts are still badly split over 
whether redemption by lump sum or reaffirmation with creditor consent are the only 
mode by which debtors might continue to retain collateral.233 
IV. REAFFIRMATION 
Section 521(2)(A) invites a debtor to "reaffirm debts."234 It is universally 
assumed that this phrase invokes the jurisdiction of section 524(c), which actually 
governs any agreement between a debtor and a holder of a prepetition claim, 
whether or not the agreement can be characterized as a "reaffirmation" of a prior 
claim.235 This section requires that the agreement be enforceable· at state law.236 
230 See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 
1992) (Butzner, J.). For authorities rejecting the notion that "if applicable" hints that options other than 
redemption or reaffirmation exist, see Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 
(11th Cir. 1993) (Dubina, J.); Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1545 n.2 (but finding that§ 521(2) nevertheless does not 
make redemption or reaffirmation only modes of retaining collateral); Waxman, supra note 111, at 193-94 
(arguing that statute would not make sense without "if applicable," because then debtors intending to 
surrender collateral would still have to state whether they are redeeming or reaffirming). 
231 11 U.S.C. § 522(t)(l)(B). 
232 See Harper, 143 B.R at 684. 
233 Judge Jim Pappas points out that "if applicable" may not bring in choices other than redemption, 
reaffirmation, or exemption. Rather, it simply points out that perhaps only a subset of these options are 
applicable to a given debtor. So conceived, "if applicable" is quite consistent with the view that the debtor 
is strictly limited to these choices. Jim D. Pappas, Section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Creditor's 
Predicament in Getting Paid as Agreed, 99 COM. L.J. 45, 59 (1994). 
234 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). 
235 According to § 524(c): 
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for which, in 
whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this title is enforceable 
only to any extent enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge ot 
such debt is waived, only if-
( I) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge under section 727, 
1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title; 
(2)(A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the 
debtor that the agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within sixty 
days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of 
rescission to the holder of such claim; and 
(B) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor 
that such agreement is not required under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any 
agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this subsection; 
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and [if applicable, that the debtor's 
attorney made certain statements to the debtor explaining the consequences of the debtor's 
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It further regulates such contracts by requiring that the agreement be reached before 
the discharge is actually granted, by insuring plenty of notice to the debtor that such 
agreements are not mandatory, and by giving the debtor a period during which to 
change her mind. 237 
One of the options that section 521(2)(A) mentions is reaffirming debts.238 If 
the debtor and creditor cannot agree on a reaffirmation, then, under at least one view 
of section 521(2)'s meaning, the debtor must either redeem the property in a lump 
sum or surrender the collateral.239 As we have seen, however, many courts have 
ruled that these options are not exhaustive; the debtor may retain property in 
exchange for unilaterally meeting payments on the prepetition security 
• agreement. 240 
Assuming that a court thinks that section 521(2) has teeth, the question arises 
whether the language of section 521(2)(A)-"reaffirm debts"-restricts the reasons a 
secured party may have in refusing to reach an agreement with the debtor. In In re 
French, 241 Judge Karen Jennemann considered whether a secured party could 
simply hold up a debtor for extra entitlements, in exchange for the reaffirmation 
agreement.242 In her opinion, a debtor will have met the requirements of section 
521(2)(A) when the debtor·unilaterally signs a reaffirmation agreement, where the 
secured party makes unreasonable demands for extra compensation: 
decision]; 
( 4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior to discharge or within 
sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving 
notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; 
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been complied with; and 
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney during 
the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such 
agreement as-
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and 
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor. 
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such debt is a consumer debt 
secured by real property. 
Id. § 524(c). 
Subsection (d)-to which subparagraph (5) refers-governs certain procedures the court must follow at 
a discharge hearing. 
236 See id. State law usually upholds a promise to repay a debt discharged in bankruptcy on the theory that 
the debtor is "morally" obligated to repay. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 83 (1979). 
237 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c). 
238 See id. § 521(2)(A). 
239 See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990)(Cudahy, J.) (holding that§ 521 requires debtor 
choose between reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender of property abandoned from estate or exempted from 
discharge); accord In re Griffin, 143 B.R. 535 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991) (Fussell, J.). 
240 See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text. 
241 185 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
242 See id. at 912. 
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If a debtor attempts to negotiate an agreement with the creditor, reaches an 
impasse, and then signs a reaffirmation agreement which (i) meets the 
requirements for approval articulated in Section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, (ii) binds the debtor to the terms of the parties' prior agreement, and 
(iii) is enforceable by the creditor, the debtor has taken sufficient acts to 
perform his or her intention to reaffirm the debt. In summary, if a debtor 
is willing to reaffirm the terms of the original agreement, has attempted in 
good faith to negotiate a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor, and has 
taken all acts otherwise necessary to reaffirm a debt under Section 524 of 
the Code, then this Court would deem that the debtor has complied with the 
requirements of Section 521 as required by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
A 1 243 ppea s .... 
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Thus, Judge Jennemann hints that reaffirmation agreements might be imposed on a 
secured party when the secured party overreaches and tries to obtain more than a 
mere reaffirmation of the old security agreement.244 
In French, the secured party had demanded payment of attorneys' fees, which 
the prepetition security agreement had called for. 245 The debtor had refused to pay 
the fee demanded.246 Judge Jenneman did not view the attempted extortion of the 
attorneys' fee as any kind of illegal overreaching.247 Thus, Judge Jennemann 
ordered the debtor to redeem, surrender or reach a qualified reaffirmation agreement 
within fifteen days.248 At least one court, however, has held that insisting on an 
attorneys' fee is indeed overreaching. Judge Sidney Brooks, in In re Hutchins, 249 
rewrote the reaffirmation agreement to lower the amount of the agreed attorneys' fee 
to an amount that seemed more reasonable to Judge Brooks.250 He then imposed 
the agreement on the secured party-a second case in which reaffirmation agreements 
reflected an involuntary element.251 
243 Id. at 914 (citing Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(Dubina, J.)). 
244 Accord In re Greer, 189 B.R. 219, 221 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (Mark, J.) (agreeing with Judge 
Jennemann's conclusion in In re French but holding that, where collateral secures several different claims, 
debtor must offer to reaffirm all secured claims). Judge Federman has strongly asserted that a debtor might 
reaffirm the old security agreement over the opposition of a secured creditor. See In re Thomas, 186 B.R. 
470, 476 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). But his statements should be limited to the facts of the case where the 
debtor had a privilege under state law to negate all defaults by curing the defaults. In essence, Judge 
Feqerman was ruling that a bankruptcy court might make a declaration that, under state law, a security 
agreement was not in default. It should also be emphasized that the security agreement had no ipso facto 
clause in it. 
245 See French, 185 B.R. at 911. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. at 913. 
248 See id. at 914. 
249 99 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989). 
250 See id. at 58. 
251 See id. at 59. 
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According to these two cases, it is not accurate to think that secured parties must 
consent to reaffirmation agreements. Other courts, however, give secured parties 
unfettered discretion to refuse reaffirmation agreements with debtors. 252 
Section 524( c) requires that the debtor have the right to rescind the reaffirmation 
agreement within sixty days from the time the agreement is filed with the 
bankruptcy court.253 Suppose a debtor does rescind, what then is the status of the 
collateral which the debtor had initially intended to retain? 
If the automatic stay has lapsed, then the secured party, of course, can repossess 
the collateral under state law. The stay will have lapsed in a chapter 7 case if (a) 
the trustee has abandoned the collateral to the debtor and if (b) the debtor has 
already obtained a discharge from debt.254 By contrast, in a chapter 13 case, 
discharge occurs only at the end of the plan itself, which could last up to five 
years.255 In chapter 13, the secured party would have to seek relief from the 
automatic stay.256 Since rescission implies nunc pro tune treatment of the relations 
between the parties, the secured party's right-if it exists-to have the stay lifted for 
the debtor's failure to perform her intention within forty-five days, as required by 
section 521(2)(B), might kick in automatically.257 At this late date, could a debtor 
redeem the collateral for its appraised value? Since the debtor had forty-five days 
to perform and did not, the debtor has no certain right to redeem. If courts believe 
that section 521(2) has teeth, the debtor might not be able to resist the secured 
party's motion to lift the automatic stay. 
CONCLUSION 
The redemption right in section 722, is important largely for automobile 
financing and for its indirect role in shaping bankruptcy law in other contexts,258 . 
also makes for a fascinating jurisprudential study. Congress sculpted the rather 
generous right in 1979, but courts and lawyers, using a great deal of creativity, have 
greatly expanded debtor rights through the use of chapter 13 "installment plans"259 
and the extension of the automatic stay which is supposed to end when a debtor is 
discharged. Congress attempted to stem this tide by enacting section 521(2), which 
supposedly makes debtors choose between redemption, reaffirmation or surrender 
252 See In re Brady, 171 B.R. 635 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1994) (Dees, J.) (finding secured party could condition 
reaffirmation of secured claim on reaffirmation of different unrelated claim). 
253 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4) (1994). 
254 See id. § 362(c). 
255 See id. §§ 1322(d), 1328(a). 
256 See id. §§ 362(c)(2)(C), 1328. This would be necessary in order to avoid the potentially extended 
completion of the plan. 
257 As to whether failure to meet§ 521(2)(A) or (B) constitutes grounds to lift the automatic stay, see supra 
notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
258 Bifurcation under§ 506(d) was a bitterly fought issue in the late 1980's, and whether§ 722's turfwould 
be stolen by § 506(d) was a major weapon in that duel. See generally Henderson, supra 44, at 187-93. 
259 See Carlson, supra note 11, at 51. 
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of the collateral. But, section 521(2) hardly succeeded in stemming the tide of 
judicial creativity in favor of debtors. The courts have shown themselves quite 
capable of picking apart section 521 (2) to exploit contradictions. They have not 
been shy in ignoring it outright. Although not all courts have swum with this tide, 
enough have done so to make one think that bankruptcy jurisprudence has a 
superstatutory life of its own, and congressional reform of the_practice is harder to 
manage than is sometimes thought. 
